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Conclusion
Given
that political representation, and not religion, drives the conflict
in Northern Ireland, it will be necessary to open up the
political process in order for Blair's devolved Parliament to be successful. This
will provide a conducive environment in which the two large voting blocks will be able to
break-up into their factional parties, and they in turn will have to work with each other
in order to gain enough power to form a coalition government. To ensure that this
will occur, the voting system should be based on Germany's system of proportional
representation in which those parties receiving five percent or more of the vote are
allowed representation in public office. With these prerequisites firmly
established, coalition governments would have to represent a wider cross-section of
society and thus limit the dominance of one group as maintained by the Orange Order and
Ulster Unionist Party. Additionally, voting solidarity could not
be maintained through previous channels of political patronage, and liberal
Protestants could pursue
their own agenda of political equality. Furthermore, London can create
regulatory commissions during the devolution time to ensure the ease
of the transition.
Works Cited
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3T. W. Moody and F. X. Martin, eds. The Course of Irish History
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4Moody and Martin 218.
5Moody and Martin 218-219.
6J. J. Lee, Ireland: 1912-1985 Politics and
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8Gough et al. 646.
9Gough et al. 647.
10Gough et al. 647.
11Hughes xiii.
12Q. Oliver, "Community Development in
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13Oliver 370.
14Hughes 2.
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15D. G. Pringle, One Island, Two Nations? A Political
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16Pringle 258.
17B. O'Leary and J. McGarry, The Politics of Antagonism:
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18O'Leary and McGarry 110.
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26O'Leary and McGarry 127.
27O'Leary and McGarry 128.
28O'Leary and McGarry 114.
29Crighton and Mac Iver 127-142.
30Hughes 85.
31Crighton and Mac Iver 127-142.
32O'Leary and McGarry 111.
33O'Leary and McGarry 112.
34O'Leary and McGarry 112. Sir John Leech was placed
in charge of a one-person judicial commission that readjusted electoral
boundaries.
35O'Leary and McGarry 112.
36O'Leary and McGarry 114.
37O'Leary and McGarry 114.
38Probert 62.
39Probert 62.
40Probert 62.
41Magee 93.
42Magee 94.
43Probert 75.
44Probert 75.
45Hughes 82.
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47Pringle 248.
48Probert 60.
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50Crighton and Mac Iver 127-142.
51Pringle 252.
52S. Wichert, "The Role of Nationalism in the Northern
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53Oliver 370-376.
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